Armored Vehicle
Armored personnel carriers (APCs) were among the key military assets during the Iran-Iraq War. The ability to move infantry across the warzones quickly can determine the outcome of a war. Fast and reliable transport in an environment where bullets, rockets, and mortar rounds are striking all around is crucial; this led to the development of APCs and armored vehicles.[1] APC is a wheeled or tracked vehicle with armored protection and no major onboard weapon, used for combat support, security operations, and transport.[2] Its protective armor—sometimes including explosive reactive armor to reduce the risk from anti-tank missiles—both safeguards the troops inside and increases mobility on the battlefield.[3]
The introduction of armored vehicles and the formation of armored units in the Iranian army dates back to 1934, when two battalions—each with one armored squadron—were formed within the 1st and 2nd Central divisions. In 1949, the United States transferred 20 armored vehicles to Iran, followed in 1952–1953 by the establishment of one armored battalion in the 1st Central Infantry Division at Bagh-e Shah (Tehran) and another in the 2nd Central Division at Eshratabad (Tehran). Gradually, the Iranian army’s armored divisions were organized to include several armored and mechanized battalions.[4]
By 1980, on the eve of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran possessed 1,075 armored vehicles,[5] including about 500 BTR variants (Soviet-made) and 325 M113s (Soviet-made),[6] while Iraq had around 2,500,[7] including 200 BMP-1s and various BTR models.[8]
The way armed vehicles are used in the war is similar to the tank warfare doctrine. Iraq deployed most of its APCs at the outset of war but struggled to use them effectively in making advances. Eventually, it stopped using them to avoid casualties. Iran’s strategy was somewhat better, though it lacked access to many newer vehicles. Overall, neither side achieved mobility with APCs significantly superior to tank operations.[9] Both sides tried to boost firepower during the war by mounting additional machine guns and anti-tank guided missiles on APCs, and some were modified to fire mortars. Increasingly, APCs were also used for logistical and support roles—such as command vehicles and ambulances—to cope with intensified artillery fire. Iraq also upgraded the armor of its BMP-1 carriers, which were vulnerable to Iranian RPGs and anti-tank missiles, reinforcing them with 35–40 mm steel plates and side layers combining rubber and steel. Vehicles like the BMP-1 served effectively as mobile command posts and were protecting infantry commanders from artillery and mortar fragments.[10]
In the early years of the war, troops often had to march on foot from rear areas to assault positions—sometimes 20 to 30 kilometers—which left them exhausted before combat and reduced their effectiveness. After Operation Ramazan (July 1982), the Iranian military commanders decided to transport forces to the frontline by APCs to preserve their power and energy. Particularly after breaking the enemy’s first defensive line, APCs were used to move troops rapidly to the second and third fronts. If units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had sufficient APCs, they could push forces forward more effectively and avoid exhaustion from long marches. Therefore, the IRGC commanders decided to use the Khashayar APC.[11] The Khashayar APC showed high mobility in marshy terrain during Operation Kheibar (February 1984) and was the only vehicle capable of transporting floating bridge sections.[12] During Operation Valfajr 8 (February 1986) and the capture of the Al-Faw,[13] these amphibious carriers crossed the Arvand River and proved effective in transporting troops and supplies across marshlands.[14]
By 1985, Iran (Army and IRGC) had between 700 and 950 operational APCs,[15] compared to about 3,000 for Iraq.[16] In Operation Karbala 5 (January 1987), the IRGC had around 1,700 tanks and APCs, many of which were captured equipment.[17] Amphibious Khashayar APCs enabled units such as the 19th Fajr Division and the 14th Imam Hussain (as) Division to transport infantry across flooded terrain at night and break into the enemy’s defense lines. In this operation, as in Karbala 4, the Khashayar APCs proved highly effective for both the infantry and their commanders, allowing the troops to maintain their strength and morale and reach their mission areas under enemy fire without suffering casualties.[18]
In the final year of the war, following Iraqi attacks, a large number of Iranian armored vehicles—including 500 tanks and APCs—fell into Iraqi hands. For example, on July 12, 1988, Iraqi troops attacked the 21st Hamzeh Division positions in the Zubeydat and Sharhani (Khuzestan) as well as those of the 77th Khorasan Division (Army) in Fakkeh (Khuzestan) and seized numerous vehicles, including 60 APCs.[19] Nevertheless, Iran also captured Iraqi equipment throughout the war, including about 250 BMP-1s.[20]
From 1986 onward, Iran began repairing and later producing APCs domestically. As a result, the first Iranian-made APC was tested in 1988 and delivered to the armed forces in 1990. Iranian defense industries managed to produce APCs and vehicles such as Boraq, BMP-2, Rakhsh, and Toofan.[21]
References:
- [1] Khabargozari-e Fars, Az Boraq ta Toofan; Khodroha-ye Zerehi ke dar Iran Sakhte Shodand (From Boraq to Toofan; Armored Vehicles Manufactured in Iran), 3 Bahman 1397, www.farsnews.ir/news/
- [2] Rostami, Mahmoud, Farhang-e Vazhaha-ye Nezami (Dictionary of Military Terms), Tehran, Setad-e Moshtarak-e Artesh-e Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran, 2nd ed., 1386, Pp. 394, 841.
- [3] Ibid.
- [4] Rafiei, Ali va Digaran, Arzyabi-ye Mizan-e Chaboksazi-ye Tipha-ye Mostaqel-e Zerehi dar Tarh-e Thamen Neirou-ye Zamineh-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran (Evaluation of the Agility of Independent Armored Brigades in the Thamen Plan of the Iranian Ground Forces), Faslname-ye Oloum va Fonoun-e Nezami, No. 55, Bahar 1400, Pp. 152–153.
- [5] Cordesman, Anthony & Abraham Wagner, Darsha-ye Jang-e Modarn — Jang-e Iran va Araq (Lessons of Modern War — The Iran-Iraq War), Vol. 1, Translated by Hussain Yekta, Tehran, Nashr-e Marz-o-Boum, 1389, p. 135.
- [6] Ibid., p. 145.
- [7] Ibid., p. 135.
- [8] Ibid., p. 156.
- [9] Cordesman, Anthony & Abraham Wagner, Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 339.
- [10] Ibid., p. 340.
- [11] Sazman-e Asnad va Madarek-e Defa Muqaddas, Amaliyat-e Karbala-ye 5, Obur az Bohran-e Nakami dar Amaliyat-e Sarneveshtsaz (Operation Karbala 5: Overcoming the Crisis of Failure in the Decisive Operation), www.defadocs.ir
- [12] Khabargozari-e Tasnim, 1398/08/01/2125982, www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/
- [13] Ardestani, Hussain & Hussain Sarkhili, Amalkard va Tajrobiyate Zerehi-e Iran dar Defa Muqaddas ba Taakid bar Zerehi-e Sepah (Iranian Armored Operations and Experiences in the Sacred Defense with Emphasis on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Armored Units), Faslname-ye Negin-e Iran, No. 27, Zemestan 1387, p. 136.
- [14] Ibid., p. 140.
- [15] Cordesman, Anthony & Abraham Wagner, Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 331.
- [16] Ibid., p. 332.
- [17] Khabargozari-e Tasnim, Ibid.
- [18] Ardestani, Hussain & Hussain Sarkhili, Ibid., p. 147.
- [19] Alaei, Hussain, Ravesh-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (The Course of the Iran-Iraq War), Vol. 2, Tehran, Marz-o-Boum, 1391, Pp. 455–456.
- [20] Jafari, Fathollah, Chenaneh — Khodnegasht-e Fathollah Jafari (Chenaneh — Autobiography of Fathollah Jafari), Tehran, Markaz-e Asnad va Tahqiqat-e Defa Muqaddas, 1402, Pp. 440–441.
- [21] Khabargozari-e Fars, Ibid.