Mediation Efforts
With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, various officials, governments, and international organizations sought to play a mediating role between the two countries. However, all such efforts faced rejection from Iranian authorities because they failed to acknowledge Iraq’ s aggression against Iranian territory, demand the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iran, secure reparations, or identify the aggressor.
During the imposed war waged by Iraq against Iran, more than 10 international organizations, along with 23 countries and certain international figures, made efforts to mediate between Iran and Iraq. Most of these initiatives, in one way or another, leaned toward supporting Iraq.
The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) established the “ Goodwill Committee” (also known as the Islamic Peace Committee) at the start of the war to mediate between the warring parties.[1] Early on, the OIC called for an immediate ceasefire without requiring Iraqi withdrawal from Iranian soil. This, combined with Iraq’ s failure to adhere to the 1975 Algiers Agreement, led Iran to reject the proposal.[2] After the liberation of Khorramshahr, the OIC conditioned the formation of a committee to identify the aggressor on the implementation of a ceasefire, which Iran did not accept. Subsequently, the OIC called Iran a warmonger country and, until the war’ s end, focused its activities on supporting United Nations resolutions.[3]
On September 28, 1980, the OIC sent a delegation— including Habib Chatty (Secretary-General of the OIC), Yasser Arafat from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Zia-ul-Haq (President of Pakistan) — to Iran, urging an immediate ceasefire between the two countries.[4] A second OIC delegation visit to Tehran took place on October 21, 1980, but it too proved fruitless.[5] A third OIC mediation team arrived in Tehran on February 28, 1981. During this visit, the Iranian government proposed three conditions for a ceasefire and peace: recognition and punishment of the aggressor; acceptance of a ceasefire only after the aggressor’ s withdrawal from Iranian territory; and Iraq’ s effective acceptance of the 1975 Algiers Agreement.[6] The delegation then traveled to Baghdad and Saudi Arabia, returning to Iran on March 3 with peace proposals. However, the proposals lacked concrete solutions to the disputes, made no reference to the validity of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, ignored the issue of addressing Iraq’ s aggression and punishing the aggressor, and offered no guarantees for the unconditional and prompt withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iran. Consequently, Iran rejected them.[7]
On April 19, 1982, the OIC mediation delegation visiting Tehran proposed that, in exchange for Iran agreeing to negotiate on the Arvand Rud, deploy neutral forces along the borders, and accept a committee to determine the aggressor, Iraqi troops would withdraw from Iranian territory.[8]
On June 6, 1982, the OIC mediation team requested that Ayatollah Khamenei, then President of Iran, travel to Mecca to meet Saddam Hussein, but Iran rejected the idea.[9]
Other OIC sessions that addressed— or partially addressed— mediation between Iran and Iraq included the Seventeenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Amman, March 1988),[10] the Fifth Islamic Summit,[11] the Coordinating Meeting of OIC Foreign Ministers (Amman, October 7, 1988),[12] and and the Islamic Solidarity and the Brotherhood Conference of OIC Foreign Ministers (Riyadh, March 13– 16, 1989).[13] All these efforts ended without success.
From the early days of the Iran-Iraq War, the Non-Aligned Movement established a Goodwill Committee and held numerous meetings at the heads-of-state and foreign ministers’ levels, emphasizing the need for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.[14] These efforts failed, largely due to Iraq’ s opposition during the early years when it had military superiority.[15]
The Non-Aligned Movement’ s most significant initiative came in 1981. Following the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers’ Conference in February 1981 in New Delhi, a peace delegation— including the foreign ministers of Cuba, India, and Zambia, as well as the head of the PLO’ s Political Department and the PLO’ s UN Representative— arrived in Tehran on May 10, 1981, to pursue mediation efforts. The delegation met with Iranian officials, including the president, and proposed establishing a demilitarized zone inside Iranian territory alongside an Iraqi withdrawal. According to then-President Abolhassan Banisadr, he and some Army commanders were willing to accept the plan but with some modifications.[16]
Other international meetings that focused on mediating between Iran and Iraq included the European Economic Community discussions (May 27, 1987),[17] the meeting of foreign ministers of the twelve European Economic Community member states in Copenhagen (July 15, 1987),[18] the Extraordinary Arab Summit in Amman (November 18, 1987),[19] the meeting of seven Arab League member states in Baghdad (August 2, 1988),[20] the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit in Manama (December 19– 22, 1988),[21] and the GCC Ministerial Council meeting in Jeddah (June 6– 7, 1989).).[22]
Among international figures, Indira Gandhi sent letters on October 2, 1980, to Saddam Hussein and then-President Abolhassan Banisadr, calling on both countries to abandon the “ futile war”.[23]
Yasser Arafat also undertook mediation efforts on several occasions, including September 24, 1980,[24] May 22, 1982,[25] May 24, 1982,[26] November 30, 1985,[27] and May 1, 1990.[28]
Among countries, the Soviet Union also announced its readiness to mediate between Iran and Iraq on January 12, 1987, expressing support for diplomatic efforts to end the conflict.[29]
In addition, the United Arab Emirates,[30] Mongolia,[31] India,[32] Yugoslavia,[33] Spain,[34] the Philippines,[35] Japan,[36] Jordan,[37] Kuwait,[38] Ghana,[39] Algeria,[40] Zimbabwe,[41] Poland,[42] Saint Kitts,[43] Greece,[44] Argentina,[45] Indonesia,[46] Paraguay,[47] Bahrain,[48] and Saudi Arabia[49] issued statements emphasizing the destructive impact of the Iran– Iraq War and calling on relevant countries and international organizations to take effective measures to end the conflict.
In all these mediation attempts, the parties avoided acknowledging Iraq’ s aggression against Iran, demanding Iraqi withdrawal, securing reparations, or identifying the aggressor. For this reason, Iranian officials considered these initiatives to lack enforceable guarantees and therefore did not accept them.
References
- [1]. Mamduhi, Farzad, Sazman-e Konferans-e Eslami dar Teori va Amal — Mowze-e Sazman dar Qebal-e Jang-e Tahmili-ye Araq Aleyh Iran (The Organization of the Islamic Conference in Theory and Practice — Its Position on the Imposed War of Iraq against Iran), Payannameh-ye Karshenasi-ye Arshad-e Olum-e Siasi, Daneshkadeh-ye Olum-e Siasi va Maaref-e Eslami, Daneshgah-e Imam Sadeq (as), 1368, p. 226.
- [2]. Ibid., Pp. 227, 230.
- [3]. Fowzi Tuiserkani, Yahya, Sazman-e Konferans-e Eslami (Sakhtar, Amalkard va Ravabet-e Aan ba Iran) (Organization of the Islamic Conference: Structure, Performance, and Its Relations with Iran), Tehran, Markaz-e Asnad-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1377, Pp. 165– 166.
- [4]. Ruznameh-ye Ettelaat, Zaman-e Bi-Tarafi Separi Shodeh Ast (The Time of Neutrality Has Passed), No. 16249, Doshanbeh 7 Mehr 1359, p. 2.
- [5]. Ibid., Dowlatha-ye Eslami be Nass-e Quran Bayad ba Dowlat-e Araq Moqateleh Konand (According to the Quran, Islamic Governments Must Fight the Iraqi Government), No. 16267, Seshanbeh 29 Mehr 1359, Pp. 1, 3.
- [6]. Ibid., Iran Khastar-e Mojazat-e Araq Shod (Iran Demanded the Punishment of Iraq), No. 16372, Yekshanbeh 10 Esfand 1359, Pp. 2, 12.
- [7]. Ibid., Heyat-e Barrasi-ye Jang Mojaddadan be Tehran Amad (The War Investigation Delegation Returned to Tehran), No. 16375, Chaharshanbeh 13 Esfand 1359, p. 2.
- [8]. Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akbar, Pas az Bohran — Karnameh va Khaterat-e Hashemi Rafsanjani (Sal 1361) (After the Crisis — Memoirs and Records of Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1982-1983), Tehran, Daftar-e Nashr-e Maaref-e Enqelab, 1380, p. 69.
- [9]. Ibid., p. 130.
- [10]. Khorrami, Muhammad-Ali, Jang-e Iran va Araq dar Asnad-e Sazman-e Mellal (The Iran– Iraq War in UN Documents), Vol. 8, Tehran, Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah, 1387, p. 154.
- [11]. Ibid., p. 312.
- [12]. Ibid., Vol. 9, p. 340.
- [13]. Ibid., Vol. 10, Pp. 252– 253.
- [14]. Amini-Far, Shahla, Iran, NAM, Araq, Jonbesh-e Adam-e Taahhod va Jang-e Iran va Araq (Iran, the Non-Aligned Movement, Iraq, and the Iran– Iraq War), Mahnameh-ye Zamaneh, Year 4, Shahrivar 1384, No. 36, p. 22.
- [15]. Ibid.
- [16]. Banisadr, Seyyed Abolhassan, Khianat be Omid (Betrayal of Hope), Tehran, Bi-Na, 1361, p. 86.
- [17]. Khorrami, Muhammad-Ali, Ibid., Vol. 6, Pp. 234– 235.
- [18]. Ibid., Pp. 259– 261.
- [19]. Ibid., Vol. 7, Pp. 204– 208.
- [20]. Ibid., Vol. 9, Pp. 111– 112.
- [21]. Ibid., Vol. 10, Pp. 71– 72.
- [22]. Ibid., p. 324.
- [23]. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/editorials/forty-years-ago-october-5-1980-pms-letters-6702884/
- [24]. Hussaini, Mokhtar, Sait-e Defa Muqaddas, Barrasi-ye Mowze-e SAF dar Jang-e Iran va Araq (Examining the PLO’ s Position in the Iran– Iraq War), https://defamoghaddas.ir/article/114/
- [25]. Habibi, Abolqasem, Ruzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (Ketab-e Noozdahom, Azadsazi-ye Khorramshahr …) (Chronology of the Iran– Iraq War, Book 19: Liberation of Khorramshahr …), Tehran, Markaz-e Asnad va Tahqiqat-e Defa Muqaddas, 1398, p. 546.
- [26]. Ibid., p. 588.
- [27]. Farahani, Hamid-Reza, Ruzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (Ketab-e Si-o-Nohom, Bakhsh-e Avval; Nokhostin Gam be Soui-e Fath-e Faw…) (Chronology of the Iran– Iraq War, Book 39, Part 1; The First Step Toward Capturing Al-Faw…), Tehran, Markaz-e Asnad va Tahqiqat-e Defa Muqaddas, 1392, p. 587.
- [28]. Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akbar, Etedal va Piruzi (Karnameh va Khaterat-e Sal 1369) (Moderation and Victory — Memoirs of 1990-1991), Tehran, 1392, p. 92; Sait-e Moasseseh-ye Motaleat va Pazhuheshha-ye Siasi, Sal-ha Pas az Tabadol-e An Nameha — Nameha-ye Roasaye Jomhur-e Do Keshvar-e Iran va Araq (Years After the Exchange of Those Letters — The Letters of the Presidents of Iran and Iraq), https://psri.ir/?id=nct8trl4
- [29]. Khorrami, Muhammad-Ali, Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 50.
- [30]. Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 67.
- [31]. Ibid., Pp. 75– 76.
- [32]. Ibid., Pp. 76– 77.
- [33]. Ibid., Pp. 77– 78.
- [34]. Ibid., Vol. 8, Pp. 113– 114.
- [35]. Ibid., Pp. 118– 119.
- [36]. Ibid., Pp. 153– 154.
- [37]. Ibid., Pp. 154– 155.
- [38]. Ibid., p. 312.
- [39]. Ibid., p. 345.
- [40]. Ibid., Vol. 9, Pp. 47– 48, 247– 248.
- [41]. Ibid., Pp. 67– 68.
- [42]. Ibid., Pp. 108– 109.
- [43]. Ibid., p. 140.
- [44]. Ibid., p. 160.
- [45]. Ibid., Pp. 165– 166.
- [46]. Ibid., p. 175.
- [47]. Ibid., p. 234.
- [48]. Ibid., Vol. 10, Pp. 71, 324.
- [49]. Ibid., p. 252.
