Historical disputes are conflicts rooted in long-standing historical relations, arising from ethnic, racial, cultural, social, religious, political, economic, and strategic differences. The Baathist regime used unresolved historical disputes between Iran and Iraq as a pretext to start the imposed war against Iran.

Historical disputes are among the underlying causes of major wars around the world. Such conflicts are generally political and cultural in nature and cannot be resolved through legal frameworks alone. They are instead addressed through principles such as political interest, justice and equity, and the benefit of one or both parties — by way of non-legal mechanisms including diplomatic negotiation, consultation, good offices, mediation, inquiry, reconciliation, and compromise. The Iraq-Iran War was one such conflict, initiated by the Baathist regime under the pretext of unresolved historical disputes whose roots go back to the rise of the Sunni Ottoman and Shia Safavid empires in the early fifteenth century.⁠[1]

Shah Ismail founded an independent state and established the Safavid dynasty in 1502 by overthrowing local rulers. This alarmed the Ottoman Empire, whose sphere of influence had by then extended eastward to Central Asia, and from that point on, wars between Iran and the Ottomans began — with the Ottomans sometimes prevailing and occupying parts of Iranian territory, and the Iranians at other times taking control of Ottoman lands.⁠[2]

The disputes between the Iranian and Ottoman empires continued for around 400 years, until the end of World War II. Four centuries of war and conflict produced more than eighteen peace treaties and several border protocols — yet none of them succeeded in establishing lasting peace and stability between Iran and the Ottomans. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the state of Iraq was founded, these long-standing disputes were inherited by Iraq.

One of these agreements — the 1913 Protocol — was imposed on Iran through the intervention and pressure of Britain and Russia, placing the Arvand River (Shatt al-Arab) and all its islands under Ottoman sovereignty. Given the coercive nature of this protocol and its disregard for Iran’ s rights over the Arvand River, Iran, from the very outset of Iraq’ s founding, demanded that border disputes be resolved and its rights over the Arvand River recognized, with the thalweg line designated as the water boundary between the two countries. Iran declared the 1913 Protocol and its attached minutes null and void — on the grounds that Turkey, as the Ottoman Empire’ s successor, had annulled it and that Iran’ s parliament had never ratified it — and subsequently made the recognition of Iraq dependent upon accepting Iran’ s rights over the Arvand River. Iraq ignored Iran’ s demands and continued the policies of the past. Eventually, the British government, concerned about the security of its interests in the region, promised Iran that it would assist in securing Iran’ s rights if it recognized the Iraqi state. Iran recognized Iraq’ s independence, but the promised support never came, and tensions between the two countries deepened further.⁠[3]

In the years that followed, sharp diplomatic notes were exchanged between the two sides. Iraq regarded the Arvand River as entirely its own, while Iran refused to accept a treaty that had been imposed on it a century earlier. Following these confrontations, Iraq brought a complaint against Iran before the League of Nations in 1934. The League suggested that the two countries work toward a resolution through direct negotiations. Iran and Iraq subsequently began talks in Tehran and Baghdad to precisely define their land and water boundaries. However, these sessions too came to nothing, as Iran objected to Iraq’ s insistence that a British representative be present at the talks.⁠[4]

With the fall of Iraq’ s monarchy following the coup of July 14, 1958, and the rise of nationalists to power, ideological tensions between Iran and Iraq resumed. The new Iraqi government invoked historical arguments to assert its claims over Khuzestan and the Arvand River, and began a policy of harassment against Shia Muslims and Iranians living in the country. This continued after the Baath Party coup of July 1968. In the first half of the 1970s, following the withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf and the handover of regional security responsibilities to the Shah of Iran, the Baathist regime pushed back against these developments. Tensions gradually escalated and led to a border clash between the two sides in late 1971, after which the Baathist government lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council, prompting the passage of Resolution 348, which called on both parties to negotiate a comprehensive agreement. After several rounds of talks between political representatives of the two countries, a treaty on state borders and good neighborliness between Iran and Iraq was eventually concluded.⁠[5]

The resolution called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of forces from each other’ s borders, and negotiations toward a comprehensive agreement. In 1975, the foreign ministers of Iran and Iraq held talks in Istanbul to negotiate the implementation of the resolution’ s articles, but the discussions yielded no satisfactory results. The deadlock did not last long, however, and on March 6, 1975, the two countries signed a declaration mediated by Houari Boumediene, Algeria’ s leader at the time — a document that became known as the Algiers Agreement. Under this agreement, all disputes between the two countries were ostensibly resolved, and the Iraqi government recognized Iran’ s rights over the Arvand River after years of refusal. Relations between the two countries improved following the signing, and both sides made considerable efforts to strengthen their ties.⁠[6]

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Baathist regime quickly recognized the new Iranian government and expressed its desire for good neighborly relations and closer ties. However, within less than two months, it gradually adopted a hostile posture, raising claims about the Persian Gulf such as the assertion that Arab rights needed to be restored, and declaring support for ethnic minority autonomy movements in Iran, effectively interfering in Iran’ s internal affairs. Through actions such as arming and infiltrating anti-revolutionary elements into Iran — particularly Khuzestan — and expelling thousands of Shia Iraqis into Iran under the pretext of their Iranian origin, Iraq effectively disregarded its commitments under the Algiers Agreement. Iraq’ s disregard for the agreement’ s provisions — including its emphasis on good neighborly relations, border security, and non-interference in each other’ s internal affairs — led to a serious deterioration in bilateral relations.

In September 1980, the Baathist regime occupied the Zein al-Qaws and Saif Saad areas (Khan-Leili and Meimak), and on September 17, using Iran’ s alleged violation of the 1975 Agreement as a pretext, unilaterally declared it null and void — in contravention of international law — and proclaimed its sovereignty over the entire Arvand River. One week later, on September 22, 1980, Iraq launched a large-scale assault across the entire border strip and attacked Iran’ s air bases and international airports. In the first weeks of the war, Iraq occupied Khorramshahr, Susangerd, Bostan, Mehran, Dehloran, Khosravi, Qasr-e Shirin, Hoveyzeh, Naft Shahr, Moosian, and Sumar, and subjected cities such as Abadan, Ahvaz, Dezful, Shush, Andimeshk, Sar-Pol-e Zahab, and Islamabad-e Gharb to aerial bombardment, artillery fire, and missile strikes.⁠[7]

Favorable international policies from the United States — in the form of support for Iraq and a declared neutrality in the war — were among the factors that enabled Iraq’ s attack on Iran. The Soviet Union outwardly declared neutrality as well, while in practice backing Iraq.⁠[8]

Saddam Hussein, Iraq’ s president at the time, launched the war after adopting the title “ Commander of Qadisiyyah” for himself — a deliberate invocation of the Arab wars against Zoroastrian Iranians. Saddam consistently referred to Iranians as Majus (Zoroastrians) and called the war a conflict between Arabs and Majus, in order to gain the support of Arab states.⁠[9]

The Baathist government’ s extensive political and propaganda efforts to highlight the historical and ethnic disputes between the Iranian and Iraqi people continued throughout the eight years of war.⁠[10] During the war years, international organizations and bodies repeatedly proposed ceasefires and negotiations to both sides, but Iran’ s consistent position was that any agreement had to include recognition of Iraq as the aggressor and the payment of war reparations. In the end, in July 1988, Iran accepted Resolution 598 and a ceasefire under mounting international and domestic political, economic, and military pressure — even though the resolution did not fully meet the country’ s demands.⁠[11]

After decades of tension, border conflict, and outright war between Iran and Iraq, the fall of Saddam Hussein’ s government in the 2003 American invasion opened a historic opportunity for the two countries to establish friendly relations.

Following the collapse of Saddam’ s government and the establishment of a provisional administration, Iran shifted its policy, criticizing the American occupation while increasing engagement with Iraqi popular groups. Unlike most Arab states, Iran endorsed the interim government in Iraq, and after the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council in 2003, it was the first of Iraq’ s neighbors to recognize the council. Iran’ s general policy was to support the council while voicing concerns over the continued presence of occupying forces in Iraq.

Iraq’ s 2005 parliamentary elections saw the Shia win the largest bloc of seats. An interim government was then formed under Ibrahim al-Jaafari, leader of the Islamic Dawa Party. This opened the door to expanding political relations between the two countries.⁠[12] Today, Iran and Iraq both need a stable relationship with each other for security and economic reasons. While the two countries still have their differences, Iraqis are well aware that the most significant action Iran has taken in recent years was helping Iraq liberate large parts of its territory from ISIS, one of the key reasons Iraqis are willing to have a friendly relationship with Iran.⁠[13]