Saudi Arabia was among the most important financial and arms suppliers to Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War.

Saudi Arabia is an Arab and Muslim country covering approximately 2,149,690 square kilometers. The majority of its population follows Sunni Islam, with a minority of Shia. The country is governed as an absolute monarchy under the House of Saud.⁠[1]

Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia were established following the founding of the Saudi state in 1928, and the Saudi embassy in Iran opened in 1935. These ties continued until 1943, when they were severed after the Wahhabis accused and ultimately executed one of the Iranian pilgrims. Diplomatic relations were restored in 1947. After the formation of OPEC in 1960, bilateral relations expanded to include economic dimensions as well.⁠[2] In the 1970s, under the Nixon Doctrine, Iran was regarded as the military pillar and Saudi Arabia as the financial pillar of U. S. policy to safeguard Western interests in the Middle East.⁠[3]

Following the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, King Khalid described the establishment of an Islamic government in Iran as a prelude to greater understanding and closer ties between the two countries. Crown Prince Fahd also stated at the time that Saudi Arabia recognized the new Iranian government and held great respect for its leadership.⁠[4] In recognition of the Revolution’ s success⁠[5] and to develop relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia sent a high-level delegation to meet Imam Khomeini (ra) in early 1979.⁠[6]

Behind the scenes, however, the Saudi leadership viewed the Islamic Revolution as a serious threat. There was genuine fear in Saudi Arabia that the revolutionary wave could spread to the country and destabilize the monarchy. This concern intensified after the establishment of the Arabian Peninsula Liberation Front office and the gathering of liberation movements in Tehran, prompting Saudi Arabia to begin quietly opposing Iran.⁠[7]

In August 1980, one month before Iraq invaded Iran, Saddam traveled to Saudi Arabia and shared his war plans with the Saudi rulers.⁠[8]

With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran deteriorated sharply. Although Saudi Arabia initially presented a neutral stance, in practice, it provided extensive support to Iraq, becoming one of Saddam’ s main financial and military backers through large loans and arms assistance.⁠[9] Between 1981 and 1988, Saudi Arabia provided Iraq with $60 billion in aid.⁠[10] It also extracted 280,000 barrels of oil daily from the Saudi-Iraqi neutral zone and sold it on Iraq’ s behalf, while transiting between 350,000 and 500,000 barrels of Iraqi oil per day through its territory.⁠[11]

On October 28, 1981, the U. S. Senate approved the sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia.⁠[12] Throughout the war, intelligence collected by these AWACS aircraft was routinely shared with Iraq.⁠[13]

Saudi Arabia also entered the economic battlefield through oil, effectively using its production and pricing policies as a tool against Iran. In late 1980 and early 1981, non-OPEC oil-exporting countries increased production to control the market, but OPEC’ s continued output restraint kept prices high. Gradually, as production rose further, oil prices began to fall. Saudi Arabia ramped up its oil production and sold at lower prices, prompting protests from other OPEC members— but to no avail. The downward spiral in oil prices only accelerated.⁠[14] Kuwait and Saudi Arabia produced oil in place of Iraq and helped it maintain exports by constructing new pipelines.⁠[15]

Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, Saudi Arabia mobilized all its diplomatic resources to isolate Iran and further strengthen the Baath regime in Iraq. It consistently took positions and actions against the Islamic Republic in regional and international organizations. In bodies such as the Arab League, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the United Nations, Saudi Arabia often opposed Iran.⁠[16] It also exerted influence within the Organization of the Islamic Conference, modifying its charter and procedural rules in ways that increased pressure on Iran. One of the main channels for anti-Iran actions was the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council, which operated under Saudi leadership.⁠[17]

Following Iraqi attacks on oil tankers carrying Iranian crude in the Persian Gulf, Iran began retaliatory strikes in 1984.⁠[18] In these operations, tankers carrying Saudi oil— one of Iraq’ s key backers— were targeted. On May 16, 1984, the Yanbu Pride tanker was attacked by Iranian Phantom aircraft while anchored at al-Jubail.⁠[19] On May 22, during one such Iranian operation against Saudi tankers, an Iranian Phantom fighter was shot down by Saudi F-15 missiles.⁠[20]

On July 31, 1987,⁠[21] during the Disavowal of the Polytheists ceremony, Saudi police⁠[22] attacked Iranian pilgrims, resulting in the martyrdom of 400 Iranians.⁠[23] In response, diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia were severed in May 1988⁠[24] and remained suspended for three years.⁠[25] In retaliation for the killings of Iranian pilgrims, Iran decided to target the Khafji oil port facilities on the Persian Gulf coast, deploying around 300 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) high‑speed boats for the operation.⁠[26] On October 2, 1987, the IRGC boats set out toward Khafji. The operation was detected by Saudi AWACS aircraft, and because U. S. and Saudi fighter jets and warships were in the area, it was ultimately called off.⁠[27]

In 1991, after Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, Iran’ s stance in defense of Kuwait’ s sovereignty helped shift the regional atmosphere in Iran’ s favor.⁠[28] Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran were restored on March 26, 1991.⁠[29] On February 2, 1991, in a press conference, King Fahd acknowledged Saudi Arabia’ s all-out support for Iraq during the war with Iran and expressed hope that the Islamic Republic would put aside the painful events that had cast a shadow over relations between Iran and the Persian Gulf countries.⁠[30]

In the 1990s, following the Iran-Iraq War and especially after Iraq’ s invasion of Kuwait, Iran-Saudi Arabia relations entered a new phase of cooperation and confidence-building during the presidency of Hojjatoleslam Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The Saudis believed that changes in the international system after the fall of Communism and regional developments had created space for a fresh start in relations. Iran also pursued de-escalation with regional countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, emphasizing that the policy of exporting the Revolution did not mean interference in the internal affairs of other states. Through this approach, Iran sought to improve ties with Islamic and Arab countries in West Asia and the Persian Gulf region. By the mid-1990s, following the Islamic Republic’ s announcement of a de-escalation policy, relations steadily improved. Despite existing differences, both sides worked to remove ambiguities and bring positions closer. However, Saudi Arabia’ s pro-American orientation, continued intervention in the Persian Gulf, attempts to replace Iran in oil markets and sales, and promotion of Wahhabism once again pushed relations toward renewed tension.⁠[31]