The Persian Gulf States :: Holy Defence free online Encyclopedia

The Persian Gulf States

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Written by: Emad Ezzatabadi Translated by: Hadi Qorbanyar
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Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman played different roles in Iraq’s war against Iran, but most of them largely supported Iraq.

Iran is located on the northern shore of the Persian Gulf, while six Arab countries lie along its southern coast. Despite many similarities, these countries also differ in many respects.

The Emirate of Kuwait, with an area of 18,178 square kilometers, lies in the southwestern part of the Persian Gulf and borders Iraq to the south. Its capital is Kuwait City.⁠[1]

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is situated on the western side of the Persian Gulf, south of Iraq. It covers more than two million square kilometers, and its capital is Riyadh.⁠[2]

Bahrain is an island country in the southern Persian Gulf with an area of about 760 square kilometers, making it the smallest state in the region. It lies near Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and its capital is Manama.⁠[3] In 1971, with Iran’s consent, British backing, and an UN-supervised referendum proposed by Britain, Bahrain was formally separated from Iran.⁠[4]

Qatar is a peninsula extending into the Persian Gulf, connected to Saudi Arabia in the south. It covers 11,521 square kilometers, and its capital is Doha.⁠[5]

The United Arab Emirates (UAE), located on the southern shore of the Persian Gulf, has an area of 83,600 square kilometers. It is made up of seven emirates, namely Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Fujairah, Umm al-Quwain, and Ajman, with Abu Dhabi serving as its national capital.⁠[6]

The Sultanate of Oman sits at the Strait of Hormuz, at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, with an area of about 300,000 square kilometers. Its capital is Muscat.⁠[7]

Before the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam transferred some of Iraq’s military and civilian aircraft to Jordan and Saudi Arabia.⁠[8] After Iraq attacked Iran, nearly all the southern Persian Gulf states supported Iraq. The Iraqi navy also needed the cooperation of other regional countries to carry out operations across the Persian Gulf region.⁠[9]

At the start of the war, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait agreed to increase their oil production and sell the surplus on Iraq’s behalf. Kuwait also passed laws that placed pressure on Iranians and Shiites who supported the Islamic Revolution.⁠[10] This was despite Kuwait’s public declaration of neutrality after the war began.⁠[11]

In the first seven months of the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia provided Iraq with more than $14 billion in aid.⁠[12] Qatar adopted an almost neutral policy, but within the framework of the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and under Saudi pressure, it still offered financial and propaganda support to Saddam.⁠[13]

Early in the war, on May 25, 1981, the six southern Persian Gulf states established the GCC. The stated aim was to promote coordination and unity for their defense, as Iraq was trying to widen the conflict, causing concern among the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms. Iraq hoped that expanding the war would shift part of its financial burden onto them.⁠[14]

In January 1981, Saudi Arabia paid France on Iraq’s behalf for the construction of the Osirak nuclear reactor and even financed its reconstruction after it was bombed by Israel.⁠[15]

In late 1981, Bahrain arrested a group of Shiites accused of plotting armed action against the state, one charge being that they had received military training in Iran. Despite Iran’s denial, Bahrain closed its embassy in Tehran.⁠[16] Although Bahrain claimed neutrality,⁠[17] it still provided Iraq with financial, political, propaganda, and military assistance and manpower.⁠[18]

After Iran recaptured Khorramshahr on May 24, 1982, the GCC issued a statement on May 31 calling for an end to the war and announcing Iraq’s readiness to return to international borders. At this stage, GCC states avoided openly backing Iraq and called for a ceasefire.⁠[19] Iran’s success worried them, as continued Iraqi attacks on Iranian shipping forced Iran to retaliate, increasing insecurity in the Persian Gulf and threatening trade routes. Moreover, the possible fall of Saddam in the war with Iran would have had dangerous consequences for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; therefore, they sought to encourage Iran to end the war.⁠[20] The Arab states were concerned that the success of either side in the war would mark the beginning of expansionist ambitions by the victorious party. The Council was also part of the United States’ measures to counter the Iranian Revolution as well as the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan.⁠[21]

By early 1983, direct financial aid from GCC countries to Iraq amounted to roughly $30–40 billion, with Saudi Arabia contributing $20 billion, Kuwait $6 billion, the UAE $2–4 billion, Qatar $1 billion, and Oman $10 billion.⁠[22] The UAE’s extensive support even harmed its own economy, which was severely strained by 1985–1986.⁠[23]

However, during the Iran-Iraq War, Oman maintained its relations with both parties involved in the conflict. It neither opposed Iran nor complied with Saddam’s call to sever ties with Tehran; yet, until the end of the war, it remained aligned with Iraq as part of the Arab bloc.⁠[24]

In 1983, Saudi Arabia, with Kuwait’s approval, decided to allocate revenues from the Khafji oil field (a joint Saudi-Kuwaiti field in Wafra) to Iraq.⁠[25]

In 1984, GCC states sent a diplomatic mission to Japan to urge it to reduce economic ties with Iran. That same year, a Saudi F-15—supported by U.S. aircraft—shot down an Iranian Phantom over the Persian Gulf.⁠[26] In January 1986, Rashid Abdullah, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the UAE, visited Tehran and, during a meeting with the President of Iran, described the UAE as a supporter of the Islamic Revolution and stated that the two countries share many cultural ties; therefore, they should expand bilateral relations.⁠[27] Accordingly, Iran’s relations with the UAE generally remained cordial during the war.⁠[28]

Kuwait was Iraq’s most important supporter throughout the Iran-Iraq War. By allowing Iraq to use its ports and anchorages, it became a major hub for Iraqi imports and exports. After Iran captured the Al-Faw Peninsula in 1986, Kuwait allowed Iraqi aircraft to pass through its airspace to attack Iran. In early 1986, Iranian forces captured the Al-Faw Peninsula,⁠[29] and Iraq’s pressures on Kuwait to cede the Warbah and Bubiyan islands increased, as these islands south of the Al-Faw Peninsula could play a key role in Iraq’s counterattacks against Iran. After the capture of Al-Faw, the Iraqi government seriously demanded the cession of these two islands, and ultimately, the two countries reached an agreement on the matter. Consequently, these islands remained under Iraqi control during the final two years of the Iran-Iraq War, during which Iranian forces suffered significant losses.⁠[30] Although no direct attacks were made on Kuwaiti islands while the Al-Faw Peninsula was under Iranian control, Iraqi military forces repeatedly used the position of Bubiyan Island for air, helicopter, and intelligence operations against Iran. Iraq’s military use of these islands reached its peak during the Al-Faw Peninsula recapture operations in 1988, which played a key role in Iraq’s retaking of the Al-Faw City.⁠[31]

On November 25, 1986, Saudi Arabia, despite its declared neutrality, allowed Iraqi warplanes that had attacked Iran’s Larak Island to refuel on its territory.

Because Kuwait’s tankers were repeatedly targeted due to its support for Iraq, it requested U.S. and Soviet naval escorts. Following Iraqi attacks on Iranian tankers on September 4 and 5, 1987, Kuwait itself was struck by Iranian Silkworm missiles. Kuwait then complained to the United Nations Security Council and expelled five Iranian diplomats.⁠[32]

Meanwhile, Oman also attempted mediation by hosting talks between Iran and Iraq in Muscat, though it was unsuccessful. Also, the country refused Saudi requests to issue a statement condemning Iran.⁠[33]

Overall, during the eight-year war, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia provided about $25–50 billion to Iraq in loans and grants, while other southern Persian Gulf states contributed over $16 billion.⁠[34]

Despite all this support, Kuwait was later harmed by Iraq. Shortly after the Iran-Iraq War ended, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Some Persian Gulf states did not initially defend Kuwait, except Saudi Arabia, which felt directly threatened. After Iraq’s defeat, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf became less eager to assume a leading role in Arab politics.⁠[35]

After the war, Iran sought to restore its regional role and rebuild relations with Persian Gulf states,⁠[36] adopting a policy of good neighborliness. It remained neutral during the 1991 (Persian) Gulf War, condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait,⁠[37] and opened its borders to Kuwaiti refugees.⁠[38]

The Kuwaiti government, in turn, addressed the UAE’s claims over the three Iranian islands through mediation, and the Speaker of Kuwait’s National Assembly, during a visit to Iran in 1992, welcomed the proposal for direct negotiations between Iran and the UAE regarding the islands. Among the members of the GCC, Kuwait maintained the best relations with Iran, though its membership in the Council required it to act in ways that would avoid displeasing any side in disputes between its Arab allies and Iran.⁠[39]

After the Iran-Iraq War, Iran also pursued a policy of de-escalation with Saudi Arabia; however, Saudi Arabia’s closeness to the United States, U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf region, and the kingdom’s attempts to play a role as Iran’s substitute—particularly in oil sales and in controlling Iran’s oil market—along with the promotion of Wahhabism and similar actions, gradually strained bilateral relations after a period of relative calm.⁠[40]

Iran’s relations with Qatar also expanded after the war. Iran supported Qatar in its border dispute with Saudi Arabia, and in 2006 Qatar was the only Security Council member to vote against Resolution 1696 on Iran’s nuclear program.⁠[41]

Iran’s relations with Bahrain improved after Iran accepted Resolution 598,⁠[42] though tensions resurfaced during the 2011 Islamic Awakening uprisings in Bahrain, when Iran supported opposition demands and condemned the crackdown by Bahraini authorities and the intervention of Saudi and UAE forces.⁠[43]

After the Iran-Iraq War, the UAE continued to assert claims over the three Iranian islands. In 1992, Iran also participated in the Abu Dhabi talks concerning the three islands, stating clearly that it would under no circumstances negotiate its sovereignty over them.⁠[44]

Among all these countries, Iran’s relations with Oman remained consistently stable. Oman also played a moderating role within the GCC regarding Iran and supported Iran’s nuclear activities.⁠[45]

References:

[1] Sait-e Rasekhoon, https://rasekhoon.net/article/show/910419?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[2] Ahmadi, Seyyed Muhammad, Joghrafia-ye Arabestan-e Saudi va Amaken-e Haramayn-e Sharifain (Geography of Saudi Arabia and the Holy Sites), Tehran: Mashaar, 1387, Pp. 12, 13, 15, 16, 18.
[3] Hasheminezhad, Seyyed Saeed, Bohran-e Bahrain (Bahrain Crisis), Pazhuhesha-ye Mantaqei, No. 5, Paeez va Zemestan 1389, p. 19; Daneshname-ye Eslami, https://wiki.ahlolbait.com/%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86
[4] Mojtahedzadeh, Pirouz, Keshvarha va Marzha dar Mantaqe-ye Geopolitik-e Khalij-e Fars (Countries and Borders in the Geopolitical Persian Gulf Region), Tehran: Vezarat-e Kharajeh, 3rd ed., 1373, p. 196.
[5] Shirzadi, Reza, Tosee va Tosee-ye Ensani dar Qatar (Development and Human Development in Qatar), Faslname-ye Motaleat-e Siyasi, Vol. 11, No. 41, Paeez 1397, p. 182.
[6] Keshvarha va Marzha dar Mantaqe-ye Geopolitik-e Khalij-e Fars (Countries and Borders in the Geopolitical Persian Gulf Region), Ibid., Pp. 164–166; Daneshname-ye Eslami, Ibid.
[7] Bashgah-e Khabargaran-e Javan, https://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/4447748/%D9%86%
[8] Soleimani Savadkouhi, Shahrokh, Eqdamat va Natayej-e Amaliat-e Nirouye Daryai-ye Artesh-e Jomhuri-ye Eslami Iran dar Moqabele ba Tajavozat va Modakhelaat-e Araq va Nirouha-ye Faramantaqei dar Khalij-e Fars (Actions and Results of the Iranian Navy in Countering Iraqi and Extra-Regional Interventions in the Persian Gulf), Tehran: DAFOOS, 1397, p. 75.
[9] Ibid., p. 127.
[10] Moradpiri, Hadi va Mojtaba Sharbati, Ashnaei ba Olum va Maarif-e Defa Mughaddas (Introduction to Sacred Defense Knowledge and Sciences), Tehran: SAMT, 11th ed., 1392, p. 60.
[11] Mousavi, Seyyed Masoud, Barrasi-ye Mavaze va Amalkard-e Kuwait dar Jang-e Iran va Araq (Examining Kuwait’s Positions and Performance in the Iran–Iraq War), Majale-ye Negin Iran, Vol. 2, No. 8, Bahar 1383, p. 83.
[12] Veisi, Hadi, Vakaavi-ye Chaleshha-ye Geopolitik-e Rabete-ye Shoray-e Hamkari-ye Khalij-e Fars ba Jomhuri-ye Eslami Iran va Taasir-e Aan bar Jahan-e Eslam (Geopolitical Analysis of the Persian Guld Council–Iran Relationship and Its Impact on the Islamic World), Faslname-ye Motaleat-e Siyasi-ye Jahan-e Eslam, Vol. 5, No. 25, Bahar 1397, p. 147.
[13] Golkarami, Abed va Digaran, Tabyein-e Teyf-e Raftari-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslami Iran dar Mantaqe-ye Khalij-e Fars: Taqabol-e Siyasat-e Kharaji-ye Vaziyat-Mehvar va Geopolitik-e Moqiyat-Mehvar (Explaining the Behavioral Spectrum of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf: Situation-Based Foreign Policy vs. Position-Based Geopolitics), Pazhuheshha-ye Joghrafia-ye Ensani, Vol. 54, No. 1, Bahar 1401, p. 104.
[14] Masjedjamei, Muhammad, Geopolitik-e Khalij-e Fars, Arabestan va Sheikhneshin-ha (Geopolitics of the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, and the Sheikhdoms), Tehran: Ettelaat, 1395, Pp. 65, 69, 71.
[15] Babazadeh, Muhammad, Jang-e Tahmili-ye Araq dar Barabar-e Iran va Mavaze-e Keshvarha va Jamei-e Beyn-ol-Melali az Manzar-e Ravabet-e Beyn-ol-Melali: Motale-ye Moredi-e Amrika, Englestan, Shuravi, Arabestan-e Saudi (Iraq’s Imposed War Against Iran and the Positions of Countries and the International Community: Case Study of the Unites States, Britain, Soviet Union, and Saudi Arabia), Konferans-e Melli Andisheha-ye Nowin va Khallaq dar Modiriat-e Hesabdari, Motaleat-e Hoqooghi va Ejtemaei, p. 5.
[16] Shafieie, Esmaeil va Digaran, Barrasi-ye Rabete-ye Iran ba Keshvarha-ye Hoze-ye Khalij-e Fars (Oman, Bahrain, Emarat-e Motahede-ye Arabi va Kuwait) (Examining Iran’s Relations with the Persian Gulf States: Oman, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait), Hamayesh-e Melli Elmi-Pazhuheshi Khalij-e Fars, p. 258.
[17] Golkarami, Abed va Digaran, Ibid., p. 103.
[18] Malekzadeh, Muhammad, Motaghayerha-ye Vagera va Hamgera dar Rabete-ye Iran ba Jahan-e Arab: Cheshmandazi bar Tamaddon-e Nowin-e Eslami (Divergent and Convergent Variables in Iran–Arab World Relations: An Outlook on New Islamic Civilization), Majale-ye Siyasat va Ravabet-e Beyn-ol-Melal, Vol. 3, No. 6, Paeez-Zemestan 1398, p. 292.
[19] Habibi, Abolqasem, Roozshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq – Azadsazi-ye Khorramshahr: Payan-e Royaye Tajzie-ye Iran (Chronology of the Iran–Iraq War – Liberation of Khorramshahr: End of Iran’s Separation Dream), Vol. 19, Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad va Tahqiqat-e Defa Muqaddas Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1397, Pp. 701–703.
[20] Masjedjamei, Muhammad, Ibid., p. 70.
[21] Sayyari, Habibollah, Olgou-ye Movazane-ye Qorat dar Rahbordha-ye Amniati-ye Khalij-e Fars (Power Balance Model in Persian Gulf Security Strategies), Faslname-ye Olum va Fanoun-e Nezami, Vol. 6, No. 14, Paeez 1388, Pp. 6–7.
[22] Veisi, Hadi, Ibid., p. 147.
[23] Muhammadi, Zia va Digaran, Naqsh-e Ravabet-e Eqtesadi dar Mizan-e Taahod-e Emarat-e Motahede-ye Arabi dar Barabar-e Iran az 1367 ta 1359 (Role of Economic Relations in United Arab Emirates’ Commitment to Iran, 1980–1988), Faslname-ye Pazhuheshha-ye Tarikhi, Vol. 53, New Series, Year 9, No. 35, Paeez 1396, p. 174.
[24] Golkarami, Abed va Digaran, Ibid., p. 102; Khabargozari-e ISNA, https://www.isna.ir/news/1402080201322/%D
[25] Babazadeh, Muhammad, Ibid., p. 5.
[26] Veisi, Hadi, Ibid., p. 147.
[27] Muhammadi, Zia va Digaran, Ibid., p. 182.
[28] Salehi, Hamid, Monaasebat-e Rahbordi-ye Emarat-e Motahede-ye Arabi ba Jomhuri-ye Eslami Iran (2000–2011) (Strategic Relations of the United Arab Emirates with the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000–2011), Faslname-ye Motaleat-e Rahbordi, Vol. 14, No. 1, Bahar 1390, p. 159.
[29] Wiki Defa, Amaliat-e Valfajr 8 (Operation Valfajr 8), https://wikidefa.ir/?id=dtfpq001
[30] Markaz-e Asnad va Tahqiqat-e Defa Muqaddas, Barrasi-ye Mavaze va Amalkard-e Kuwait dar Jang-e Iran va Araq (Examining Kuwait’s Positions and Performance in the Iran–Iraq War), https://defamoghaddas.ir/index.php
[31] Sait-e Tahlili Khabari Asr-e Iran, Moroori bar Parvande-ye Siah-e Hokoomat-e Kuwait dar Hasht Sal Jang-e Iran va Araq (Review of Kuwait’s Dark Record During the 8 Years of the Iran–Iraq War), https://www.asriran.com/fa/news/106807
[32] Mousavi, Seyyed Masoud, Ibid., Pp. 84, 86, 88, 89.
[33] Ibid., Pp. 86, 88, 89; Khabargozari-e ISNA, Ibid.
[34] Moradpiri, Hadi va Mojtaba Sharbati, Ibid., p. 154.
[35] Masjedjamei, Muhammad, Ibid., Pp. 73, 74.
[36] Veisi, Hadi, Ibid., p. 149.
[37] Simber, Reza va Digaran, Siyasat-e Jomhuri-ye Eslami Iran dar Qebal-e Keshvarha-ye Shoray-e Hamkari-ye Khalij-e Fars (Islamic Republic of Iran’s Policy Toward the Persian Guld Cooperation Council States), Faslname-ye Motaleat-e Bonyadin va Karbordi-ye Jahan-e Eslam, Vol. 2, No. 4, Zemestan 1399, p. 55.
[38] Hamedani, Abdolreza, Tahlili bar Ravabet-e Siyasi-ye Iran va Kuwait, 1961–1988 (Analysis of Iran–Kuwait Political Relations, 1961–1988), Faslname-ye Motaleat-e Khavarmiane, Vol. 23, No. 24, Zemestan 1379, p. 150.
[39] Ibid., Pp. 154–155.
[40] Mousavi Dohmordi, Seyyed Muhammad, Tarikhche-ye Ravabet-e Iran va Arabestan-e Saudi az Zaman-e Reza Shah ta Konun (Charkhe-ye Reqabat va Taqabol) (History of Iran–Saudi Arabia Relations from Reza Shah to Present: Cycle of Competition and Confrontation), Faslname-ye Motaleat-e Farhangi va Siyasi-ye Khalij-e, Vol. 3, No. 9, 1395, p. 78.
[41] Jalilvand, Masoud va Digaran, Barrasi-ye Ravabet-e Iran va Qatar (Examining Iran–Qatar Relations), Majale-ye Pazhuheshha-ye Siyasi va Beyn-ol-Melali, No. 18, Bahar 1393, Pp. 75, 76.
[42] Shafieie, Esmaeil va Digaran, Ibid.
[43] Khajehsarvi, Gholamreza va Digaran, Hoviat va Siyasat-e Kharaji-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslami Iran dar Qebal-e Tahavvolat-e Bahrain (Identity and Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran Regarding Bahrain Developments), Siyasat-e Jahan, Vol. 6, No. 3, Azar 1396, p. 205.
[44] Arab-Esmaeili, Mahmoud va Soleiman Qasemian, Jazayer-e Seh-Gane-ye Irani: Pishine-ye Tarikhi-ye Abu Musa, Tonb-e Bozorg va Tonb-e Kuchak (Iranian Three Islands: Historical Background of Abu Musa, Greater Tonb, and Lesser Tonb), Tehran: Kanoon Andishe-ye Javan, 1395, Pp. 47, 49.
[45] Khabargozari-e ISNA, Ibid.

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